Ransomware attacks rarely begin with encryption. Long before systems are locked and ransom demands appear, attackers may already have access to the credentials they need to enter an organization’s network.
According to the 2026 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), 73% of ransomware victims in the analyzed dataset had an associated infostealer infection or credential leak in the preceding year. Half of those leaks surfaced within 95 days of the ransomware event.
These findings highlight the relationship between stolen credentials and ransomware attacks. Credential theft is not always an isolated incident. It can be the beginning of a larger criminal supply chain in which stolen login information is collected, distributed, validated, and eventually used to compromise organizations.
Understanding how this process works is increasingly important as infostealers, credential marketplaces, and ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations continue to evolve.
Ransomware has developed into a highly organized criminal business. Rather than carrying out every stage of an attack themselves, threat actors increasingly specialize in different activities.
Ransomware developers create and maintain malicious software. Initial access brokers identify and sell access to compromised networks. Affiliates purchase that access and deploy ransomware against targeted organizations.
This division of labor allows ransomware operations to scale without requiring every participant to possess advanced technical capabilities.
Stolen credentials are a valuable commodity within this ecosystem.
Infostealer malware collects sensitive information from infected devices, including saved passwords, browser credentials, active session cookies, and VPN configuration data. This information is packaged into logs that can be distributed through underground marketplaces, subscription services, and private channels.
The value of stolen credentials increases as they move through the supply chain. Initial access brokers identify working corporate accounts, verify their usefulness, and package them for resale.
Research cited in Enzoic’s latest ebook found that standard user access can sell for approximately $700, while administrative access can command around $1,300.
For ransomware affiliates, purchasing valid credentials offers an alternative to developing exploits or finding their own way into a network.
Infostealer infections present a particular challenge because the information they collect can remain valuable long after the original infection.
A compromised personal device, for example, may expose credentials that an employee also uses for corporate applications. If those passwords remain valid, attackers may be able to use them to access business systems.
Password complexity requirements alone cannot identify this type of exposure. A password that satisfies every organizational policy can still be compromised through malware, credential reuse, or an unrelated breach.
The threat also extends beyond passwords.
Infostealers can capture active session cookies that represent an authenticated user session. If successfully replayed, these cookies may allow attackers to access an account without completing another multifactor authentication (MFA) challenge.
Meanwhile, the distribution of stolen credentials has changed. Threat intelligence researchers have observed increased activity through Telegram channels and subscription-based feeds, where stolen information can circulate outside traditional breach databases.
A credential does not have to appear in a publicly disclosed breach to become a security risk.
This creates a visibility challenge for organizations relying exclusively on periodic password checks or publicly known breach information.
The connection between infostealers and ransomware is particularly concerning because credential theft and ransomware deployment may occur at different points in time.
The 2026 DBIR found that half of the associated credential leaks surfaced within 95 days of the ransomware event.
During this period, stolen credentials may change hands several times. Initial access brokers can identify valuable accounts, verify access, and sell those credentials to ransomware affiliates.
Once access is purchased, attackers can focus on escalating privileges, moving through the network, and reaching critical systems.
This process demonstrates why credential exposure should be treated as an ongoing security risk rather than a one-time event.
The speed of these activities may also increase as attackers adopt AI-assisted tools. Research discussed in Enzoic’s ebook examines how autonomous capabilities could accelerate credential validation, victim identification, and decisions about whether compromised access should be exploited or resold.
As these capabilities evolve, organizations may have less time to identify and address exposed credentials before attackers put them to use.
Traditional ransomware defenses often focus on identifying malicious activity after an attacker has entered the environment. While these controls remain important, organizations also need to address the credentials that can enable unauthorized access.
A password may be secure when created but become compromised days, weeks, or months later. Without ongoing visibility, that exposure can remain undetected while the credential continues to provide access to corporate systems.
Continuous compromised credential monitoring helps close this gap by identifying passwords that become exposed after their creation.
Combined with timely remediation, this approach can reduce the opportunity for attackers to use stolen credentials to establish or maintain access.
The objective is not simply to identify weak passwords. It is to recognize when credentials that were previously considered secure become a liability.
As ransomware operations become more specialized and credential distribution channels continue to evolve, reducing the availability of usable compromised credentials becomes an important part of disrupting the criminal supply chain.
The relationship between infostealers and ransomware extends well beyond the initial theft of a password. It involves an interconnected ecosystem of malware operators, credential marketplaces, initial access brokers, and ransomware affiliates.
Enzoic’s new ebook, From Stolen Logins to Locked Systems: The Infostealer-to-Ransomware Pipeline, explores the four stages of this process, the economics driving credential-based attacks, and the role of threat intelligence in identifying compromised credentials before they are exploited.
Download the ebook to examine how stolen login information moves through the ransomware supply chain and where organizations can intervene to reduce their exposure.